20 years ago this week, Rover Group pulled out of the US new car market.

Why? Because the business strategy was to sell upwards of 30k cars a year over there and it never achieved anything like that.

Factor in appalling J. D. Power initial quality results, plus the resultant cacophony of bad press, and it’s not hard to see why Rover fled with its tail between its legs.

The whole experience was one of great intentions but failed execution. Historically, British cars had always sold reasonably well in the states, particularly the sports cars. Rover wanted to revive this, and enjoy useful returns from what was then the world’s largest car market – first with executive models and later with an all-new sports car.

Add in the fact its launch car, the Rover 800, was actually a Honda Legend – a car already sold in the US as the Acura Legend (and thus already homologated) – and the logic was unfailing. Austin Rover Cars of North America (ARCONA) was duly established in 1986, selling a 2.5-litre V6 Rover 800.

Well, not quite: the cars were actually marketed under the Sterling brand. Thus, the launch car was actually a Sterling 825. With real wood veneer and lush Connolly leather, it was every inch the trad-modern British car.

US buyers agreed, with initial sales matching the well-established Honda/Acura: no mean feat for Rover, given the high standing Honda had in the US.

Being British, though, the company of course snatched defect from the jaws of victory.

Because, the rot quickly began to set in. Those J. D. Power survey results flowed… and, frankly, damned the Sterling brand mercilessly. Electrical problems, paint problems, corrosion, unreliability – the whole sorrowful lot was revealed by disenamoured US owners. The headliner was morbidly amusing: leather turned green in the sun. Not funny if you were an owner, though. A tragedy if you were Rover.

Overestimates, overproduction

It was all going wrong. In October 1989, recalls AROnline, 1800 people were laid off at the Cowley production plant. Weeks of work were cut in November, December and January. Plant turnover was 900 cars a week: it was geared up to do double. All the preparation work for those glorious US sales was going to waste. The US wasn’t buying.

Desperation set in. Rover released an image of the Rover 800 Coupe in 1990, a full two years before it was due to go on sale. All to try and rouse interest in the flailing US division – after all, the Coupe was designed specifically with the US market in mind.

Mind you, Rover’s admirable pricing stance was not helping things: the firm refused to discount. In a country that takes car discounts for granted even without the rampant price war that was underway at the time, this was misguided. Yet, in the early days, Sterling dealers couldn’t budge. They had their margins set in stone and they didn’t allow for much movement.

Well, I say ‘dealers’. In another sound idea turned sour, the 160 Sterling dealers weren’t actually stand-alone outlets. They were multi-franchise dealers, and thus, shared floorspace with Cadillacs, Buicks, Jeeps, even Daihatsus.

As the brand was selling a couple of cars a month, salesmen didn’t give it time and didn’t bother to learn the nuances. There was no loyalty. Sterling simply couldn’t gain traction with the people who were meant to be selling it. Another black mark.

Glimmer of hope?

Rover USA did eventually do something right: it installed Graham Morris as president. Former man behind the TR7 plant, he spoke very sensibly in late 1989 to Autocar, acknowledging the division’s failings and vowing to put them right.

By then, the company was renamed Sterling Motor Cars, Inc. It was trading with incentives, including $5000 cash back (mainly to shift all the unsold cars). Its dealers were happy and said quality was improving, after 44% of them told J. D. Power they’d be happy to leave a year earlier.

It was still bloody – 14k sales in 87 had dropped to 9k in 88 and would struggle to hit 6k in 89 – but Morris was saying the right things.

His business model? Range Rover in the US. That also used a multi-franchise dealer model. It worked. How? By being a niche maker with a desirable image. Sterling would achieve them same.

But then, bang. In August 1991, Rover pulled out, for the third time in 20 years. Chief executive George Simpson said it was all down to economic conditions, but disastrous sales pretty much saw to it anyway. They hadn’t picked up in 1990: 4015 were sold. 1991? 1878 to the end of July. It was disastrous. It was maybe inevitable.

But it was something that should not have happened.

How was it possible to fail when selling Honda engineering, which US buyers liked, topped off by British design and luxury, which US buyers liked, through a broad-network multi-franchise dealer network, which US buyers liked? Anyone?

The painful ache of irony

Ironies continued after the brand’s departure from the US. That’s because the US market was never to get the R17 facelift car, launched in 1992. This in itself was tragic, for it was a car that would surely have at least stated the US turnaround.

It was, remember, the first modern ‘aero’ car to bring back the traditional chrome grille, brilliantly integrated by Woolley. Remember the fuss it caused over here? Imagine how that would have gone down in the US.

The R17 also benefitted from many of the lessons learnt in the US. Rover, in fairness, had listened to all those complaints, and waded through all the J. D. Power statistics. The engineering department was duly charged with ensuring electrics didn’t go pop, leather didn’t turn green. The R17 was the quality-leap product of all that engineering. Which was was never to make it to the market that led to it

Nor, indeed, would the Coupe. Presenting Rover with yet more problems. Goodness, Europe certainly didn’t want a large 800-derived Coupe: but as there was no other home for it, lumbered with it we were. A tragic, complete waste of resource that once again showed how misguided the US pullout was.

The more you look at it, both the harder yet the easier it is to believe. But, given how Rover Group is no longer with us, maybe it’s also a lesson in how not to do things?

I do, however, have a treat for those of you who are particularly wistful and upset. Here is the last Sterling 827 sold in the US. Buy it and savour the memories…

Do you have any views on the failed Rover US exploration?

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Rover underwhelmed the world with the 1995 Rover 400.

There were many cars that could have marked the point where the more recent Rover rot set in: I point to this overpriced, bland-looking, too-small replacement for one of Rover’s top-5 best cars ever.

The reasons for its mediocrity are much, much-discussed elsewhere. Even so, there were surprises and delights that could be gleaned from the launch: tediously dull it sure was, but it still had its moments.

MOMENTS

The 400 was the last Rover-Honda co-car. As with the 600, author Steve Cropley explained, it was basically a Honda with Richard Woolley-designed Rover clothes. Doors were common (what IS it with BL cars and shared doors?) but all the other panels were different.

It was 6 inches shorter than the Vauxhall Cavalier class of cars Rover intended to pitch it against. A lot smaller, in other words.

Why the apparent naively in stealing such a large slice of Ford Mondeo sector sales, then? Well, because it was 4 inches longer than the old Rover 400 – and as that car had proven surprisingly successful in the large family car market, so Rover’s plans may not have been so misguided after all.

HONDA CONSTRUCTION

It was launched with 1.4-litre and the then-new 1.6-litre version of the K-series engine. Rover was reluctant to give a date to Cropley for the launch of the 1.8-litre version, “although they admit proving work has begun”. Was it proving, even back then, that the head gasket was weak?

The build of the bodies was of interest: they were all built by Honda’s plant in Swindon. The Rover creation happened at Longbridge; conversely, it turned into a Honda Civic at Swindon.

The all-steel body was an impressive 20 percent stiffer than its predecessor, which Rover said allowed it to optimise NVH. It also allowed it to improve the ride quality over even the Honda it was derived from. Rover recalibrated the dampers, too – so successfully that Autocar was told it set “a new comfort standard for Rover cars”. Rover benchmarked it against the ‘supple’ Peugeot 306, apparently, rather than ‘stiffer’ German hatchbacks.

The Longbridge firm fitted more wood and its own-brand seats inside: these were actually new-look versions of those in the old Rover 200/400. The steering wheel was also carried over from before. Good ol’ British enterprise.

BULLISH

Rover was bullish: Cropley was told Longbridge had been equipped to build more than 200,000 of them a year. Double the number of old Rover 400s: the usual eye-watering BL trick of sales optimism had clearly returned.

Even so, Cropley reckoned the design, manufacturer and quality control showed the “lifesaving” influences of Honda: significant traits he’d noticed, given the foibles of British cars of the past. Rover qualities were, he reckoned, the shape, the engines and the suspension refinement, proving “Rover had accumulated expertise of its own”.

Sage words: Rover engineers continued to prove this in future years, too – but Cropley had picked up on a key point. With the loss of Honda, after 16 years, Rover lost a partner to design and productionise all-new cars.

Cropley actually revealed the downfall of Rover, years before it actually happened. It may well have boasted ample expertise of its own, which the wonderful Rover 75 proved to aplomb. But, with the loss of BMW, Rover lost the ‘lifesaving’ influences in design, manufacture and quality control that would provide the raw materials the skilled engineers could work from.

The final irony is the fact this same Rover 400 was still on sale a decade later, as the Rover 45, in the company’s dying days. Being orphaned meant Rover simply couldn’t replace it. Mediocre it may well have been, but the Rover 400 was also a landmark car – the last all-new volume family Rover be launched (the 75 was a sector above and not a volume car to the same extent; the Rover 35/55? They, alas, were never to arrive…).

It wasn’t rotten, but it wasn’t good enough, even when new. See why I think it’s a rotter?

+ MG insight ensures insurance advantage

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MG last month revealed a masterstroke that proves how car companies can win big by being small.

The 1.8-litre turbocharged 160hp MG6 has remarkable insurance groups: it starts at 13 for the base car, while the range-topper stretches to, well, just 14.

That’s unheralded in this sector – the 150hp Ford Focus 1.6 Ecoboost Titanium is rated at 19, a Skoda Octavia 1.8 TSI Elegance is 22… and a 1.4 TSI 160 VW Golf GT is a staggering 30!

Why? Many things, including top speeds of 130mph, 137mph and 137mph respectively. Which got MG Motor thinking…

See, the chaps there know the chaps at insurance group assessor Thatcham very well. They’re on the phone often, probably worked with some of them in a past age, may even go down the pub with ‘em on occasion.

It is this close relationship that revealed an amazing fact: limit the top speed of your car, and you can save “several” groups on predicted insurance rating. Who’d have thought!

Initially, potential customers didn’t like the idea of an electronic limiter. But when told they could save on insurance, nearly everyone voted instead to go for the speed cap.

It means the MG6 will launch next week (Thursday 14 April) with class-leading insurance ratings, that are more akin to a supermini than a turbocharged large family hatch with 17-inch alloys and boot spoilers. In these days of insurance premiums shooting up 20%-plus in a year, that’s a massive advantage.

Wouldn’t have happened in a larger firm, they argue: that’s why it hasn’t happened before. Proof, they add, of how size isn’t everything…

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AUTOCAR man Steve Cropley interviewed the team behind the MGF back in 1995.

His piece is full of fascinating findings: 5 of them caught my eye, which helped show that the MGF was much more than just a rebodied Metro.

Such as:

1 Europe-first EPAS system
MGFs weren’t initially to have PAS. Late implementation meant a simple solution was required. Enter electric power steering – which Rover initially only was to fit on Japanese-market cars, to help with parking. Speed-sensitive, it had then never before been seen in Europe.

2 Trick adjustments to Metro rear suspension
Metro rear suspension anti-dive caused the MGF’s tail to rise and toe-out under braking, and squat under power. Bad. So, to the existing subframe, engineers junked the bottom A-arm, in favour of 3 new lower bits:

•    Bottom link
•    Track control arm
•    Brake reaction rod

These were anchored in different places on the subframe, for optimal geometry. The result was one ‘as pure in practice as that of a uniquely designed system’.

3 Subtle changes to Metro front suspension
Well, just one – the steering arm was shortened, to speed up the steering ratio and improve the Ackermann effect

4 Posh Hydragas units
These were more expensive, with less inbuilt ‘stiction’. They moved at lower loads than in, say, the Metro. Richard Parry-Jones would be proud. That’s why Dr Alex Moulton wanted to see them on the Rover 100 – but Rover couldn’t justify the expense on a low-end car.

5 BMW-spec windscreen frame strength
BMW gave the MGF the final green light. German input was minimal, though: the only contribution was the adoption of the BMW roadster’s specification for windscreen frame strength. Does this mean the MGF has the same windscreen surround as the Z3?

Any more insider facts on the MGF, please share them here!

Land Rover’s ride quality secret

How Ford would have made a Rover

Rover rides with NASA

MG nearly launched an SUV

ARONLINE has come up with a real gem – a prototype of an MG off-roader!

Based on the SsangYong Rexton, it shows the genius of Peter Stevens; his restyled bit, the front end, really is properly smart, I reckon.

It was to be called MG due to licensing issues over the Rover name, and would most certainly have enraged MG die-hards.

I, for one, can maybe see the merits, though – despite the mediocrity of the base vehicle. What sort of benefits could a tie-up with SsangYong have brought, for example? Yes, the firm’s been in trouble recently, but it also has a very promising new contemporary Qashqai rival waiting in the wings.

Imagine if MG Rover had been able to get in early on a co-development, Honda-style, with this? Coupled with a Fiat Stilo-based mid-range hatch, and perhaps a Renault Espace-derived people carrier? Even a tie-in with Lotus-owning Proton? We can but dream…

Twist-beam rear suspension is fundamentally flawed
My obsession over rear suspension on front-drive cars continues. You’ll no doubt be delighted to hear.

Latest view? That of a chassis suspension contact. His view is that twist-beam rears can never be as good as the far superior multi-link alternative.

This is because of two fundamentals. They lack lateral stiffness. And they allow the wheels to far too readily camber-steer when cornering. In journo-speak, this is the difference between and floppy and stiff rear end.

Tuning is still a massive part of how a car will turn out, he says. But the base multi-link engineers have to work from is that much better to start with, so they stand a better chance…

Fuel is going up
FUEL has risen by 2p a litre. With VAT, that’s 2.3p a litre. For the average tankful, it’s £1 a shot up.

One fuel retailer is trimming the rise for another week. But surely, as fuel has been bought in advance, they all should, until current stocks run out? One to watch.

Even so, I’m filling up today.

Saloons are dead in the UK
RENAULT for years went against the grain and offered saloon versions of its mid-range Megane.

Not anymore. It’s just revealed the tidy-looking Fluence, which is built in Turkey and based on the excellent current Megane platform.

But there are no plans to bring it into the UK. Proving that family buyers want family hatchbacks, not fuddy-duddy saloons.

When one of the market stalwarts leaves the sector, you know it’s now of minimal importance. Which is what makes it such a tragedy that Chevrolet’s fantastic Cruze is saloon-only.

Give this baby a hatch (for which there are no plans, given its world car status – what, with the rest of the world preferring saloons), and it could be the bargain-buy family hatch of choice.

Alas, we’ll never know. But at least it ensures there will remain a future contender for the Star In A Reasonably Priced Car.

Relax. It’s ESP

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